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Abstract
It is shown that in a model where agents have single-peaked preferences
on the sphere, every Pareto optimal social choice function that is strict or
coalitional strategy-proof, is dictatorial.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that restricting preferences to be single-peaked may be a means
to escape the Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) Theorem, which says
that strategy-proof social choice functions on the full preference domain and
with range cardinality at least three, are dictatorial. Single-peaked preferences
were studied already in Black (1948). Further references include Moulin (1980),
Kim and Roush (1981), Border and Jordan (1983), and Peters et al (1992),
and this list is not exhaustive. In all those papers, typically, coordinatewise
median-like rules turn out to be strategy-proof, besides satisfying other desirable
properties. In the present paper, agents have single-peaked preferences on the
sphere, i.e., the surface of the three-dimensional unit ball. We show that every
Pareto optimal rule that is strict strategy-proof or coalitional strategy-proof
must be dictatorial – this in spite of the single-peaked preference assumption.
Here, strict strategy-proofness means that if an agent misreports, either he is
strict worse off or the outcome assigned by the rule does not change at all.
It is still an open problem whether mere strategy-proofness and Pareto op-
timality imply dictatorship: an example at the end of the paper suggests that
it does, but we do not have a proof. The example concerns a coordinatewise
median rule, which, in many models, is typically not only strategy-proof, but
also strict and coalitional strategy-proof.
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We follow similar arguments as in O¨ztu¨rk et al (2013), who consider single-
dipped preferences on the two-dimensional disc. Of course, on the sphere, every
single-peaked preference is a single-dipped preference if we take the anti-podal
point of the peak as the dip – so the results in this paper also hold for single-
dipped preferences.
2 Model and preliminaries
The set of alternatives is the unit sphere A = {x ∈ R3 : |x| = 1} , where
|.| denotes Euclidian distance. The set of agents is N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥
2. Subsets of N are called coalitions. Each agent i ∈ N has a single-peaked
preference on A, denoted by its peak p(i): a point x ∈ A is weakly preferred to
a point y ∈ A if |x− p(i)| ≤ |y − p(i)|. Here, distance is measured along the
sphere, but since this distance is isomorphic with Euclidian distance within the
closed unit ball, we just keep the same notation |.|.
A profile is a vector p = (p(1), p(2), . . . , p(n)) ∈ AN . A social choice function
or rule ϕ assigns to each p ∈ AN a collective decision ϕ(p) ∈ A. A point x ∈ A
is Pareto optimal for a profile p ∈ AN if there is no x′ ∈ A \ {x} such that
|x′ − p(i)| ≤ |x− p(i)| for all i ∈ N with at least one strict inequality. Rule ϕ
is Pareto optimal if ϕ(p) is Pareto optimal for every p ∈ AN .
Let S ⊆ N . Profiles p and q are S-deviations if p(i) = q(i) for all i ∈ N \ S.
Rule ϕ is manipulable by S ⊆ N at p ∈ AN via q ∈ AN if p, q are S-deviations
and |ϕ(p)− p(i)| ≥ |ϕ(q)− q(i)| for all i ∈ S, with at least one inequality
strict; manipulable by S ⊆ N if there are S-deviations p, q ∈ AN such that ϕ is
manipulable at p via q; coalitional strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by any
S ⊆ N ; intermediate strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by any S at p via q
such that p(i) = p(j) for all i, j ∈ S; strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by
any {i}, i ∈ N ; strict strategy-proof if for all i ∈ N and {i}-deviations p and
q, either ϕ(p) = ϕ(q) or |ϕ(p)− p(i)| < |ϕ(q)− p(i)|; and intermediate strict
strategy-proof if for all S ⊆ N and S-deviations p, q ∈ AN with p(i) = p(j) for
all i, j ∈ S, either ϕ(p) = ϕ(q) or |ϕ(p)− p(i)| < |ϕ(q)− p(i)| for all i ∈ S.
A coalition S ⊆ N is decisive for ϕ if for every x ∈ A and every profile
p ∈ AN with p(i) = x for all i ∈ S we have ϕ(p) = x. If for a particular agent d
coalition {d} is decisive, then d is a dictator. In that case, ϕ is dictatorial.
In this paper we will show for a Pareto optimal rule ϕ which is strict strategy-
proof or coalitional strategy-proof, that the set of decisive coalitions is an ultra-
filter. In general, a collection D of coalitions is an ultrafilter if (i) N ∈ D; (ii) for
each S ⊆ N either S ∈ D or N \ S ∈ D; and (iii) S ∩ T ∈ D for all S, T ∈ D. It
is well-known and easy to see that an ultrafilter D contains a unique singleton
{d}. Hence, if the set of decisive coalitions for a rule ϕ is an ultrafilter, then ϕ
is dictatorial.1
We state the following preliminary result.
1This is a familiar approach, see Kirman and Sondermann (1972) and Hansson (1976).
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Lemma 2.1. Let ϕ be a Pareto optimal rule that is strict strategy-proof or
coalitional strategy-proof. Let D be the set of decisive coalitions for ϕ. Then (i)
N ∈ D and (ii) for each S ⊆ N either S ∈ D or N \ S ∈ D.
Proof. (i) follows from Pareto optimality of ϕ. For (ii), note that ϕ is strategy-
proof. Then (ii) follows by similar arguments as the corresponding Lemma 2.5
in O¨ztu¨rk et al (2013). 
The remainder of the paper will concentrate on proving (iii) for ϕ. We
conclude this section with some spherical terminology, notations, and facts.
A great circle G is the intersection of A with a plane through the origin. A
great circle G divides A into two disjoint, open hemispheres.
Each point x ∈ A has an antipodal, i.e., the point of A with maximal distance
to x. For distinct non-antipodal points x, y ∈ A, [x ⌢ y] denotes the shortest
closed arc between x and y, which is a subset of the great circle through x and
y. Notations like [x ⌢ y), (x ⌢ y], and (x ⌢ y) are self-explanatory. If x and
y are antipodal points then [x ⌢ y] = A. If x = y then [x ⌢ y] = {x}.
The perpendicular bisector of a closed arc [x ⌢ y] is the great circle that
passes through the midpoint of [x ⌢ y] and is perpendicular to [x ⌢ y].
A set C ⊆ A is convex if it contains all the arcs [x ⌢ y] joining any two
points x, y ∈ C. The convex hull of a set X ⊆ A is the set Co(X) = ∩{C : X ⊆
C, C convex}.
Remark 2.2. Let G be a great circle and let H be one of the hemispheres
induced by G. Let p ∈ AN such that p(i) ∈ G ∪H for all i ∈ N , and p(i) ∈ H
for some i ∈ N . Then x ∈ A is Pareto optimal for p if and only if x ∈
Co({p(1), p(2), . . . , p(n)}).
3 Strict strategy-proofness and coalitional strat-
egy-proofness
In this section we show that for a Pareto optimal rule the set of decisive coali-
tions is closed under intersection if the rule is strict strategy-proof or coali-
tional strategy-proof. We start with considering strict strategy-proofness. In
the proof of the following proposition, we use the easily established facts that
strict strategy-proofness implies intermediate strategy-proofness and intermedi-
ate strict strategy-proofness.
Proposition 3.1. Let ϕ be Pareto optimal and strict strategy-proof, and let S
and T be decisive coalitions. Then S ∩ T is decisive.
Proof. Contrary to what we wish to prove, suppose that S ∩ T is not decisive.
Let X = S \ T , Y = S ∩ T , and Z = N \ S. Hence X ∪ Y = S and Y ∪ Z =
N \ (S \T ) ⊇ T are decisive since S and T are decisive, and X ∪Z = N \ (S∩T )
is decisive by Lemma 2.1.
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Figure 1: Second part of the proof of Proposition 3.1
Let G be a great circle with equidistant points a, b, and c, and let p ∈ AN
with p(i) = a for all i ∈ X, p(i) = b for all i ∈ Y , and p(i) = c for all i ∈ Z. We
denote p = (aX , bY , cZ). We first show that ϕ(p) /∈ G.
Since X ∪ Y is decisive, hence ϕ(bX∪Y , cZ) = b and ϕ(aX∪Y , cZ) = a, it
follows by strict strategy-proofness that
|a− ϕ(p)| < |a− b| or ϕ(p) = b
and |b− ϕ(p)| < |b− a| or ϕ(p) = a . (1)
Similarly, since X ∪ Z and Y ∪ Z are decisive, we derive
|c− ϕ(p)| < |c− a| or ϕ(p) = a
and |a− ϕ(p)| < |a− c| or ϕ(p) = c (2)
and
|c− ϕ(p)| < |c− b| or ϕ(p) = b
and |b− ϕ(p)| < |b− c| or ϕ(p) = c . (3)
If ϕ(p) = a, then (3) is violated, hence ϕ(p) 6= a, and similarly ϕ(p) 6= b and
ϕ(p) 6= c. If ϕ(p) ∈ (a ⌢ b), then (2) is violated, hence ϕ(p) /∈ (a ⌢ b).
Similarly, ϕ(p) /∈ (a ⌢ c) and ϕ(p) /∈ (b ⌢ c). Therefore, ϕ(p) /∈ G.
Let H1 and H2 be the two hemispheres separated by G. Assume without loss
of generality that ϕ(p) ∈ H1. For any x ∈ A, we denote the profile (xX , bY , cZ)
by px, so p = pa. Consider a sequence of points (dk)k∈N ∈ H2 converging to
a. By Remark 2.2, fk := ϕ(pdk) ∈ H2 ∪ G for every k ∈ N. Since H2 ∪ G is
compact we may assume that (fk)k∈N converges to some point f
∗ ∈ H2 ∪ G.
Now f∗ 6= a, otherwise ∣∣fk − a∣∣ < |ϕ(p)− a| for large k, so X could manipulate
via pdk at p, contradicting intermediate strategy-proofness.
Let the great circle L∗ be the perpendicular bisector of [ϕ(p) ⌢ f∗]. Let
(L∗, f∗) and (L∗, ϕ(p)) denote the two hemispheres induced by L∗ and con-
taining the points f∗ and ϕ(p), respectively. If a ∈ (L∗, f∗), then for large k
we have |a− ϕ(p)| > ∣∣a− fk∣∣, so that as before X can manipulate at p via
pdk . If a ∈ (L∗, ϕ(p)), hence |a− ϕ(p)| < |a− f∗|, then for large k we have
|dk − ϕ(p)| <
∣
∣dk − fk
∣
∣: then X can manipulate at pdk via p, contradicting
again intermediate strategy-proofness. Hence a ∈ L∗.
Let e ∈ (f∗ ⌢ a) (See Figure 1). Since |a− ϕ(p)| = |a− f∗| we have
ϕ(pe) 6= f∗, otherwise intermediate strict strategy-proofness would be violated
at p via pe.
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Let ek ∈ (fk ⌢ dk), k ∈ N, such that (ek)k∈N converges to e. For every k ∈
N, by intermediate strategy-proofness,
∣
∣ϕ(pek)− ek∣∣ ≤ ∣∣ϕ(pdk)− ek∣∣, otherwise
X could manipulate at pek via pdk ; and
∣
∣ϕ(pdk)− dk
∣
∣ ≤ |ϕ(pek)− dk|, otherwise
X could manipulate at pdk via pek . Since ek ∈ (fk ⌢ dk), we obtain ϕ(pek) =
ϕ(pdk) = fk for every k ∈ N. By similar arguments as before for the point a,
it follows that e is on the perpendicular bisector L∗∗ of [f∗ ⌢ ϕ(pe)]. Hence,
|e− ϕ(pe)| = |e− f∗|. But then
|a− ϕ(p)| = |a− f∗| (since a ∈ L∗)
= |f∗ − e|+ |a− e| (since e ∈ (f∗ ⌢ a))
= |ϕ(pe)− e|+ |a− e| (since e ∈ L∗∗)
≥ |ϕ(pe)− a| (by triangular inequality).
Hence, |a− ϕ(p)| ≥ |ϕ(pe)− a|, which by intermediate strict strategy-proofness
implies ϕ(pe) = ϕ(p), and thus e ∈ L∗, contradicting e ∈ (f∗ ⌢ a). 
We can now state our first main result.
Corollary 3.2. Let ϕ be Pareto optimal and strict strategy-proof. Then ϕ is
dictatorial.
Proof. By Lemma 2.1 and Proposition 3.1, the set of decisive coalitions for ϕ
is an ultrafilter. Hence ϕ is dictatorial. 
We proceed by considering coalitional strategy-proofness.
Proposition 3.3. Let ϕ be Pareto optimal and coalitional strategy-proof, and
let S and T be decisive coalitions. Then S ∩ T is decisive.
Proof. Contrary to what we wish to prove, suppose that S ∩ T is not decisive.
Let X, Y , and Z be as in the proof of Proposition 3.1: as there, X ∪ Y , Y ∪Z,
and X ∪Z are decisive. Consider a profile p = (aX , bY , cZ) where a, b, c ∈ A are
distinct points in the same hemisphere and such that the angles in the triangle
with edges [a ⌢ b], [b ⌢ c], and [a ⌢ c] are less than 90◦. By Remark 2.2,
ϕ(p) ∈ Co({a, b, c}).
Suppose φ(p) /∈ [a ⌢ b]. Let m be the point of [a ⌢ b] closest to ϕ(p). Then
|a−m| < |a− ϕ(p)| and |b−m| < |b− ϕ(p)|, so that X ∪ Y can manipulate at
p via (mX∪Y , cZ). This is a violation of coalitional strategy-proofness. Thus,
ϕ(p) ∈ [a ⌢ b]. Similarly one shows that ϕ(p) ∈ [c ⌢ a] and ϕ(p) ∈ [b ⌢ c],
but this is not possible. We conclude that S ∩ T is decisive. 
By this proposition and Lemma 2.1 we obtain our second main result.
Corollary 3.4. Let ϕ be Pareto optimal and coalitional strategy-proof. Then ϕ
is dictatorial.
It is an open problem whether Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness
imply dictatorship. If not, coordinatewise median rules would be the typical
candidate rules. The following example, however, suggests that such rules will
be manipulable.
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Example 3.5. In order to stay on the sphere while taking coordinatewise me-
dians, we express the points of A by two coordinates, namely the angle with
the vector (1, 0, 0) and the angle with the vector (0, 0, 1), both in degrees. Now
suppose there are three agents with peaks p(1) = (0◦, 0◦), p(2) = (0◦, 90◦),
and p(3) = (90◦, 45◦). In Euclidian coordinates these are the points (0, 0, 1),
(1, 0, 0), and (0, 1
2
√
2, 1
2
√
2), respectively. The coordinatewise median rule as-
signs the point (0◦, 45◦), hence ( 1
2
√
2, 0, 1
2
√
2) in Euclidian coordinates. If agent
3 reports p˜(3) = (90◦, 0◦) instead, then the coordinatewise median rule would
assign the point (0◦, 0◦) or (0, 0, 1), and it is easy to check that this is closer to
agent 3’s true peak (0, 1
2
√
2, 1
2
√
2) than the sincere outcome ( 1
2
√
2, 0, 1
2
√
2) is.
Thus, agent 3 manipulates successfully.
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